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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
ETHICAL PHILOSOPHIES AND SOME IMPLICATIONS  
FOR EDUCATION

by



KARUNA AUSMAN

A THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Ethical Philosophies and Some Implications for Education submitted by Karuna Ausman in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.





## DEDICATION

To my husband for his support and encouragement





## ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the bases upon which moral judgments are made and the relationships which may exist between joining ethical value judgments and learning values in an educational setting.

Three major theories for making ethical value judgments are examined--naturalism, emotivism, and intuitionism, with the author highlighting the virtues of naturalism using this as a base upon which to criticize the other theories. Her conclusion regarding moral judgments recognizes the dilemma philosophers experience in attempting to resolve the question of explaining how moral judgments are made by referring to only one theory. The author emphasizes that while there is insufficient evidence to suggest that one theory will answer the question, certainly sufficient evidence suggests that all three theories have merit.

The author briefly examines literature regarding the way in which values are inculcated in the learning environment. While there are differing opinions on what constitutes an ideal learning environment, or which values are to be taught, the author highlights the trends towards confluent education.

In final conclusion, the author argues that not one, but all three theories are applicable to making moral judgments. She argues for an intergration of the three theories and this, together with a learning environment



where a humanistic and analytical skills may develop, will encourage the individual to make valuations and reach moral conclusions.





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## Chapter I: Introduction

The topic of Ethical Philosophy and Moral Education is so vast that it is impossible to address even a small number of the questions which arise. It must be realized that any conclusions are derived within the context of limited and inconclusive evidence.

The intention of this thesis is twofold; to examine the bases for making value judgments and to determine relationships between the making of value judgments and learning of values in the educational setting.

As it appears important for the educator to be concerned about how moral judgments are made, it seems equally important that he should be concerned about the learning environment within which one may learn how to make ethical judgments. It is a simple matter to create such a learning environment if it is accepted by the educator that the ethical principles defined by the culture and the state are the primary principles to be accepted without question and inculcated into society's participants.

However, the broader perspective of what constitutes sound ethical principles cannot be ignored. This demands that all persons in the culture should have the capability of examining values and norms with the objective of either accepting, rejecting or modifying them. The achievement





requires persons to reject passive learning environments, and to begin to question how worthwhile are the basic ethical principles. The participant may begin with the basic question of 'how are ethical judgments made?' This may be synonymous with answering the question, 'how are ethical judgments justified?' From a realization that ethics must be viewed from basic premises and just principles, it is then possible to question whether the learning experiences of the young, including those acquired in educational institutions, are adequate in terms of the young developing skills which enable them to question existing cultural values.

It seems logical to begin with the question 'how are ethical judgments made?' by reviewing the major theories which are directed towards answering the question. Naturalism, Intuitionism and Emotivism are three major theories which hope to achieve this end.

The naturalism theory argues that ethical judgments are based upon an objective evaluation of the facts. Its major premise is that the facts or evidence are apparent through observation of the natural environment. The consequences of any action observed are evaluated, and on this rationalistic basis, values are formed. Chapter II examines naturalism, mainly through the writings of Foot, who is a firm proponent of this theory.

Some philosophers have recognized that all ethical judgments could not be explained simply by observing



natural phenomena and have argued that a person has a generalized awareness of whether something is good or bad. This intuitionist approach was supported primarily by Moore who argued that the meaning of certain words does not contain natural properties and therefore serves to refute naturalism. I have examined Moore's theories in some depth because the acceptance of naturalism depends on the rejection of intuitionism and as Moore is the major force, an examination of his argument is necessary.

Frankena suggests that ought may be derived from is, whereas Searle argues to the contrary. Both Prichard and Ross also support the intuitionist theory.

A third theory, called emotivism, recognizes a deficiency in both the naturalistic and intuitionistic theories. This deficiency is the tendency to ignore the importance of words in arousing the emotions. One concern with the theory has been the absence of a link between words and value judgments. Barnes suggested that words would cause one to act in a manner directed by emotions.

It is Stevenson who argues most profusely that emotive language is successful in attempting to change or modify a person's interests. Although I have expressed some concern about the tendency for Stevenson to argue, at times, the cognitive approach, he is the most ardent supporter of the emotive theory, and to that extent, I have directed much of my examination of this theory within





the context of his writings.

Chapter V is an attempt to determine whether one or more of the theories is applicable to answering the original question. I have no intention of doing so in the introduction, but rather encourage the reader to review this part in order to understand my preliminary conclusions. To understand why I draw these conclusions, it is necessary for the reader to examine each argument and counter-argument for each position.

The question of ethics in education is much more difficult to approach and I would refer the reader to the initial portions of Chapter VI, where the major concerns and problems are highlighted. Briefly, the question is not what values are taught to the student, as this is an ongoing and accepted role of the educational system in the culture. Rather, it is the question of how a person may learn to make ethical judgments, not within the context of the educational or cultural setting, but from what may be referred to as first principles.

By briefly reviewing the work of several major moral education philosophers, I can only conclude that the existing between ethical philosophy and the role of ethics in the educational setting is not strong. Indeed, a great deal of further research is required.

On the question of the relationship between ethical philosophy and moral education, Hare, Wilson and Kohlberg have attempted to provide guidelines to the educators. Hare



argues the principle of universalizability, Wilson that morality centers on respecting the rights and interests of others, and Kohlberg, who suggests that a person moves through stages of development, within the social framework. Unfortunately, an explanation on how ethical judgments ought to be made is not forthcoming.

I would trust that the reader would realize that only a brief examination of the research on this subject has been conducted. However, I am confident it represents recognized major work on this topic. Consequently, the conclusions in Chapter VII represent the major conclusions drawn from the works highlighted. While those are the conclusions of the author, I would trust that with a topic so vast and amorphous, the reader at each part, will draw personal conclusions.



## Chapter II: Naturalism Theory

Naturalism is a philosophical term which refers to something that exists in a natural sense as being explainable by using the natural sciences. Naturalism is able to explain entities and/or events by using scientific methodology. It does not describe what might exist in the environment or in the universe in terms of the kinds of events or situations, but merely what does exist there can be explained by using scientific methodologies. Therefore, naturalism must be considered as a form of a methodology rather than a theory in itself.

The basic tenets of naturalism might be described as follows: the entire universe is comprised of natural objects which are observable and exist within a certain natural order. Changes in natural objects are the result of natural causes. For a natural object to change from one state to another or from one object to another, there must have been a natural cause which exists within the system of natural objects. Therefore, there are no non-natural causes but rather all natural causes are within the system of nature itself. The system of nature includes the natural objects and natural causes. The natural order is not only a system of natural objects, but of natural processes. Nature is a self-contained system in which the objects, and those things which affect the objects can be explained in





terms of natural processes.

Natural method is simply explaining natural processes through identification of the natural causes responsible for them, and testing only given explanation with regard to consequences that must hold if it is true.<sup>1</sup>

The natural method seeks to establish natural laws which serve to explain the interrelationship of objects to one another. This applies equally as well to persons, as the natural processes which make up the mental and social lives of persons are equally within a system of nature. This simply implies that all persons exist within the natural system so that the philosopher who is examining the state of a person must do so within the context of the natural order of things.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the individual does or thinks can be explained in terms of what is happening and affecting him in the natural environment. It purports to be a rational explanation because the individual is affected by objects, whether they are inanimate or living. Having to live within the social order of things creates a natural system within which his behavior can be analyzed and perhaps predicted.

The natural method has as its basis a rationality. Rather than relying upon a set of doctrines, a scientific methodology is viewed as a tool upon which anything can be explained in the natural system. Therefore, reason is used to determine what occurs in the natural environment which serves as a rational approach to explaining behaviors.



Whenever something is to be explained in nature, scientific methodology is applied which will lead one through various steps to a conclusion.

Science is the most thorough and rigorous method of achieving explanations and reaching conclusions. It does so because premises or hypotheses can be tested according to scientific methodology. There is nothing ultimate about knowledge, but rather knowledge continues to increase because of the constant application of scientific methodology. In essence, science is a theory of logic which in turn is a theory of enquiry.<sup>3</sup>

The naturalist claims that there is no knowledge that exists outside of science. However, when one attempts to explain what is happening in the natural environment, the scientific enquiry method is the only viable method. It is a rational method which will lead one to conclusions about what is happening in one's universe.

It is important to know, as far as naturalism is concerned, that the universe has no moral character except for the fact that human beings exist in this universe. Human beings are counted as among the objects which exist in the natural environment, and therefore, they are explainable by means of the scientific methodology.

Human institutions and practices, the modes of experiences of men, the goals and values of individuals and groups, are all natural and no less so than the wheeling of galaxies and the evaluation of species.<sup>4</sup>

The natural method ignores moral institutions as a





means of explaining occurrences in the environment. Moral institutions are codes which have been established by societies in response to some particular need, that need being the possible structuring of the universe. Therefore, resolving moral disputes and explaining moral theories will be carried out in the same manner as examining any other factor in the universe, namely by using scientific methods. This allows for the examination, through scientific methodology, of the various institutions which exist in a society.

Naturalists claim that nature itself exists as a system and all things within the system, including human beings, are only sub-systems. All persons and objects are just part of the natural order of things, and this includes moral institutions. These can all be examined by using scientific methodologies.

One aspect of naturalism is that it does not encompass an explicit philosophy. Naturalists simply leave the entire area wide open by stating that there is a natural order or system of things which can be explained through scientific enquiry. The naturalists insist that philosophy examines things which are different than that which exists in real life. It seeks to answer questions in the abstract, questions which exist more in the vagueness of mind than are observable in the environment. The naturalist does not concede his position by listening to these arguments, simply stating that the scientific enquiry method will be



successful in responding to only philosophical enquiries.<sup>5</sup>

Let us now examine naturalism in terms of ethical naturalism. It states that there is no distinction between establishing facts on any matter, and evaluating those facts. In order to evaluate facts, one must have a clear understanding and knowledge about the facts. If one is to make a moral assessment, one does so by examining what is in the environment first.<sup>6</sup> This is consistent with the naturalist viewpoint which states that all things can be explained by examining the natural environment. The main concern is that the empirical scientist is quite competent to explain the natural world, but his view as to the moral assessment is no more authoritative than anyone else's. "According to ethical naturalism, moral judgments just state a special sub-class of facts about the natural world."<sup>7</sup> Judgments about the reliability of certain actions are factual judgments because they are examined within the context of the existing social order and the institutions. Human institutions exist as a fact in the universe, and only exist as a set of sub-facts which can be analyzed and upon which an evaluation can be made. One may say that anything which an individual might be doing, he is doing so for the good of the social order, or for his individual pleasure, or for the pleasure which it gives to others. Here one criticism of naturalism is that if a man is doing something, which represents a fact, then it does not follow that he ought to be doing it, or that it is good that he is doing it.



The ethical naturalism theory does not justify whether or not an individual ought to be doing something or whether it is good that he is doing something which follows from the fact that he is doing it. What one may question is whether something ought to be done is identical with whether something is being done. This is a basic question in terms of observing facts and questioning whether an individual should be performing an action or different action.

Another major criticism is that there is a separation between the questions of right and questions of fact. Questions of fact are certainly not always questions of right. However, the right or wrong of something in a society is defined by law and laws are in essence, facts. Anti-naturalists may agree that one should determine all the facts before making an evaluation however, this could be interpreted to mean that one must consider basing value judgments on something other than facts.<sup>8</sup>

John Dewey stated:

that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that the educational process is one of continually reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.<sup>9</sup>

Dewey was one of the major proponents of naturalism. His position was that individuals learn best when they are learning from life itself. It is the experiences which one encounters that result in a sense of growing of the individual. The power to grow depends upon interacting with others. Habits are formed from interacting with the natural





objects in the environment. Growth is the readjustment and changing of learned habits. Therefore, growing is an activity in itself, where the individual examines situations through experiences and changes the course of direction. The direction may include attitudes and habits which constitute his individuality. The definition of education is: "the increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged."<sup>10</sup> All activities are interconnected with one another so that as an individual pursues one particular activity, he learns from it and therefore changes all future activities. For example, if I were to place my finger into a flame, I would find it is hot and the next time I see a flame, I would in all likelihood realize that placing my finger in the flame will result in a burn. This implies that one now has power over the direction one pursues. A person can therefore better anticipate what is going to happen and be better prepared for its occurrence. Through the educational process, an individual develops skills in order to anticipate what might be happening as a result of a certain course of action. We learn because after a particular act is performed, we note what has happened. Dewey is stating that individuals will increase their growth by having experiences but each time they have some experience they will change their habits or attitudes. To do means that an individual goes through a process of evaluation of what has just recently been done



and how it impacted upon him and his future dispositions.<sup>11</sup>  
To quote Dewey:

to learn from experience is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like, the undergoing becomes instruction, discovery of the connection of things.<sup>12</sup>

Moral development is within the context of the individual's ability to learn through social interactions with others. Such moral attributes as discipline, natural development, culture, social efficiency, are moral traits which are learned only through observing what the impacts of one's behaviors are upon others. Critics of the naturalistic approach would claim that virtues should be examined from first principles and not within the context of their effect upon others.

Dewey further states that an individual develops and trains his mind in an environment which encourages intellectual activity. The real challenge is to find those activities which will result in reflective experiences. Reflective experience is viewed as a process of confusion about the state of things, interpretation of given facts, a survey of that which is considered relevant, development of a hypothesis and a conclusion based upon the hypothesis.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, Dewey is really saying that reflective experiences are gained only through the scientific methodology, and therein exists the link between his position and naturalism. It is within the context of this process that he defines





reasoning. It is interesting to note that the very basis of his thinking concerns experiential approaches. The experiences cannot be carried out in isolation. Although Dewey advocates a reasoning approach including that attributable to moral virtues, it must be done through experiencing which is a function of the interaction with one's total environment. Therefore, the evaluation occurs in terms of examining what is happening in the natural universe.<sup>14</sup>

Ideas, as previously stated, are seen as some kind of a connection between activities and the consequences of these activities. They are useful only inasmuch as they are acted upon and until they are tested in certain situations, the full usefulness of the idea does not become apparent. Ideas can be generated by the individual from viewing the external environment, testing those ideas and reaching conclusions as to their worthiness. Testing ideas and observing their impacts results in a reflective sense of using the mind.

How does Dewey link the method of reflective learning through experience with morals? He claims that moral education, as part of the curriculum, is practically hopeless when it is set up as a means of developing the character. Lessons about morals simply specify what the idealized morals are in society, but do not create within the individual a degree of acceptance or rejection of those particular morals. The individual must search that out for himself and decide what moral values he feels are acceptable. This is possible only by accepting a particular value, testing it out on



others, and through the experience to judge whether or not it is an acceptable moral value. Dewey further indicates that the Socratic-Platonic teaching "identifies knowledge and virtue - which holds that no man does evil knowingly, but only because of ignorance of the good."<sup>15</sup>

This statement implies that man must have knowledge in order to gain some insight into what is good. Dewey would argue that "knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books or from others, but was achieved through a prolonged education." Furthermore, he argues that the term knowledge may refer to many things, however based upon the knowledge a person acquires, he gains convictions which are tested in experience. A person's convictions will result in conduct. From knowledge, tested through experiences, a person develops convictions which form the basis of his conduct.

The relationship between knowledge and activity is a central point of Dewey's argument. What is learned through activities in a social setting involves cooperation with others. Through this cooperation there is a development of moral knowledge. To quote Dewey:

Just because the studies of the curriculum represents standard factors in social life, they are organs of initiation into social values. As mere school studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth. Acquired under the conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the qualities of mind are discussed under the topic method of learning; are all of them intrinsically moral qualities. Open-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility, for developing the consequences



of ideas which are accepted, are moral traits.<sup>17</sup>

He continues that certain character traits become implicit within our social relationships such as truthfulness and honesty. He views them as being moral in the sense that they are not isolated but rather they are interconnected with thousands of other kinds of attitudes which the individual carries and structures in order to operate as fully and adequately as he can in a social environment. We are discussing moral and social conduct of persons when interacting with others.<sup>18</sup>

Whitehead defined utilizing an idea as "encompassing feelings, hopes, desires, and all kinds of mental activities which adjust thoughts to thoughts."<sup>19</sup> He further states that when one has an idea, the next step is to prove it. This is carried out either by experiment or logic. No ideas are proved unless individuals feel it is worthy to do so. Any ideas individuals want to prove must first pass this test. He states that the environment of learning is a function of:

genius of the teacher, intellectual type of the pupil, prospects in life, opportunities afforded by the immediate surroundings of the school, and the allied factors of this sort.<sup>20</sup>

Proving ideas within a social setting permits a person to test the ideas to determine which are valuable. It also enables one to discipline the mind so that it can be "trained in the comprehension of abstract thought and in the analysis of facts."<sup>21</sup>





Whitehead argues that "the profound change in the world which the nineteenth century has produced is that the growth of knowledge has given foresight." He claims that foresight is possible only by having acquired special knowledge. Through specialist study, a person exhibits style, according to Whitehead "the ultimate morality of mind." The person with style is one who pursues a special study of knowledge for the love of the subject itself. Whitehead argues that the education system must be flexible in providing opportunities for persons to select their specialized areas of study.

It appears that both Whitehead and Dewey emphasize that virtues cannot be taught. This controversy exists between what is taught to the individual, forming habits and attitudes, and what the individual is capable of learning through independent intellectual activity. All persons are creatures of habit in the sense that there are certain common modes of behavior which everyone does adhere to in a social setting. Moral philosophers are concerned with what ought to be and what ought to be done, using such words as good, bad, right, and wrong, to assist in their analyses. These words can be used to express particular feelings about something without having it related precisely to a particular fact or occurrence in the environment. As R.S. Peters states, morality is concerned with the reasons why one is doing something however we question the validity of these reasons.<sup>22</sup>



Peters accepts the premise that persons are creatures of habit and tradition and live by certain rules and regulations. However, he also argues that individuals will look at the "intelligent application of these rules to particular cases." He claims to be a "staunch supporter of a rationally held and intelligently applied moral code."<sup>23</sup> He accommodates this divergency between rationality and habits by stating that a man must hold to a certain rational code by subscribing to higher level principles and then using intelligence to revise these higher level principles to changing circumstances. The individual, through empirical knowledge, will assess what is occurring in the environment, will make evaluations, which will change his particular moral codes depending upon the conclusions that he derives from testing. It is interesting that Peters finds the higher order principles to be: impartiality, truth-telling, liberty, and the consideration of interests.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, since they are very broad in nature, the individual is free to determine the specific kind of conduct that should be adopted using intelligent reasoning to achieve the aims of these broad principles. It is these higher order principles which serve as the basis for making rules and regulations which can be modified in accordance with changing circumstances.

Although some might argue that this implies that there is rule-setting for society, Peters would counter-argue that there are always some basic rules that must be followed. These basic rules are higher order principles and leave



flexibility for the individual to rationally change the rules within the context of changing circumstances. He senses that any social, economic or geographically-based societies must have some rules and regulations for order to exist.

Peters indicates that when considering moral education, there exist different positions on how virtues can be taught. One position emphasizes habits and tradition while the other emphasizes intellectual training. He argues that moral education must pass on the procedural and basic rules of the society. The challenge to moral education is how to pass on habits of behavior without stultifying the development of rationality. Peters argues that the wide range of actions possible under a set of circumstances makes it impossible for a person always to act from habit. He learns concepts and within these concepts applies intelligence to determine a course of action. To quote Peters:

For the child has to see that a vast range of very different actions and performances can fall under a highly abstract rule which makes them all examples of a type of action. If the child has really learnt to act on a rule, it is difficult to see how he would have accomplished this without foresight and intelligence. He might be drilled or forced to act in accordance with a rule; but that is quite different from learning to act on a rule.<sup>25</sup>

Foot states that the whole of moral philosophy could be expressed in terms of the following statement:

the truth or falsity of statements of fact is shown by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact.<sup>26</sup>





Statements can be proven in terms of the kind of evidence presented and what is considered to be valid evidence is dependent upon the meaning of the expressions in the statement of fact. It is impossible for two persons to agree with the same statement of fact, and then consider different things as evidence. If a man is given factual evidence upon which to make judgments, he must accept the evidence. It is impossible for him to rationally reject factual evidence; however, he is in a position to reject any kind of an evaluation if he chooses.

Foot suggests that "an evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based." What a person may see in the meaning of 'good', another person may see as something entirely different.<sup>27</sup>

Foot considers two assumptions about evaluations; first, "some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving evidence at all", and second, "given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the conclusion because this does not count as evidence for him."<sup>28</sup>

Foot firstly argues that the evaluative meaning of 'good' cannot be described using some object as a frame of reference. If a person says that he is proud, dismayed or frightened, the description of the object of pride, dismay or fear does not have a logical relation to the original



statement. How one sees the object will determine the degree of feeling of pride, dismay or fear as these imply an internal relationship to the object. Without what Foot refers to as a special background it is impossible to determine what is an action to be proud of or to be in fear of. To quote Foot on this point: "it is surely clear that moral virtues must be connected with human good and harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything you like good or harm."<sup>29</sup>

Assumption one is refuted by Foot, on the basis that: "no one should be allowed to speak as if we can understand 'evaluation', 'commendation' or 'pro-attitude', whatever the action concerned." With assumption two, Foot does not accept the premise that a person may accept the factual premise but refuse to accept the evaluative conclusion. Otherwise it would now seem that there exists a logical gap between facts and values.<sup>30</sup>

Foot disagrees with any notion that a gap exists between fact and value. She uses the term 'injury' within the context of an 'action-guiding' sense where there are things which one wishes to avoid. But she argues that 'action-guiding' or 'commendatory' words have an artificiality associated with them. When one speaks of injury or courage, a person is doing so beyond the facts. How does one make the evaluation that something is injurious or courageous? One answer would be for a person to ask; 'whether it is injurious to me', or 'whether I should be courageous'. Foot



sees the crucial question as: whether we can give anyone a reason why they should be courageous or avoid injury. Foot argues that such virtues as courage have a reason only inasmuch as a man wishes to do something or act in a certain way. Whether it be injury, courage or justice, a person will always face a choice, to accept or not accept; to act or not to act. Therefore, no logical gap between fact and value can be said to exist.<sup>31</sup>

Foot states that we observe things happening around us which can be considered right or wrong, or just or unjust. It is these physical occurrences in our environments, whether people or objects, that lead one naturally to a conclusion. Therefore, what happens in the universe leads us directly to evaluative conclusions in a logical fashion, and there cannot exist a separation between statements of facts and evaluations. It appears that Foot is saying that given certain kinds of factual information, an individual must always draw an evaluative conclusion.

Foot also argues against:

the version of argument in morals currently accepted, seems to say that, while reasons must be given, no one need accept them unless he happens to hold particular moral views.<sup>32</sup>

Moral arguments may always break down because of the particular moral views that are held by individuals. Whenever there is disagreement between two individuals over what is right or wrong, it is a question of whether or not a conciliation can be reached.





According to Foot, if a man in making moral judgments is to be free from criticism; "he must have brought forward evidence where evidence is needed and must have disposed of any contrary evidence offered."<sup>33</sup>

Hare states that moral judgments can be considered in terms of a descriptive premise and an evaluative premise. No evaluation is made from descriptions alone. There is never any problem with descriptions because it represents a fact to which all persons would be expected to agree. The major problem, of course, is with the evaluation. He states that when making an evaluation, everyone is forced back to some major moral principle. One can say that a particular action is bad, and if questioned as to why, one can declare that a person is lying and that lying is bad. One would then question why lying is bad under the premise of higher moral principles. An individual can give no reason at all for statements of evaluation because it happens to be exactly the way he feels about the situation given a certain kind of fact.<sup>34</sup>

This argument is made in support of the contention that there is no logical relationship between statements of fact and statements of value. Foot opposes these points of view because she states that individuals will always make evaluations. The nature of the evaluations persons may disagree with, but given a certain set of facts, all will agree on those facts, but perhaps disagree with the evaluations. Nevertheless, according to Foot, persons will



always make an evaluation. She states in essence, that if there is to be a relationship between facts and values based upon the viewpoint of a descriptive premise, then it should serve as evidence for the evaluation. What does Foot mean by 'descriptive'? She means that a descriptive word is not emotive, does not commend, and does not entail an imperative.<sup>35</sup> If the non-naturalist claims that the separation between facts and values exists, he must do so on the basis that he has found a special feature or characteristic in the value judgment. He must determine exactly what the special feature of the value judgment might be so that it exists as a common criterion. This is some kind of a characteristic which is essential to an evaluative word such as the word 'good'.

We do know that in the very ordinary sense, 'good' is considered to be a descriptive word. When I say 'he is a good boy', I am describing a certain mode of behavior. Foot says, that if there is a characteristic in evaluations, then it might be possible for the characteristic to be in the factual premise, as well as in the evaluative conclusion.<sup>36</sup> To reinforce this point, Foot uses the word 'rude' as an example. She says that rude is a fairly mild condemnation and that it carries an evaluative connotation. However, when one says that something is rude, we are also doing so in terms of how someone's conduct has affected us. There are a host of conducts which are defined to be rude such as walking away from a person who is talking to you, or forcing



oneself upon others. It is very difficult to separate the action which is considered to be the fact and is descriptive and the evaluation which the action has engendered. Hence, there is a kind of criterion within the action itself which is carried forward into the evaluation. In the example, the nature of the action gives one an evaluation that the action is rude. The very major premise upon which Foot's argument is based is that one cannot say that something is rude in isolation from something happening. I cannot sit on a chair in a corner of an empty room by myself, and declare something to be rude. It is meaningless in that context. Rudeness is associated with some kind of action related to etiquette or good conduct.

Foot further indicates in her example, that there may be very strict rules of evidence which are carried forward to the evaluative conclusion. Anyone referring to moral terms, must do so within the context of these rules and even when one is using words such as; good, right, wrong, or bad, he is doing so within the terms of the evidence which he observed in the natural environment. Foot further states:

It is open to us whether moral terms do lose their meaning when divorced from the pleasure principle or from some other set of criteria, as the word loses its meaning when the criterion of offensiveness is dropped. To me it seems this is clearly the case; I do not know what could be meant by saying that it was someone's duty to do something, unless there was an attempt to show why it mattered if this sort of thing were not done.<sup>37</sup>

Another example by Foot centers around the opinion a person might have regarding torturing people. Upon what





basis is a man to determine whether the pain inflicted upon another person for the extracting of information is or is not beneficial. For the good of the state, a person may consider this practice not only acceptable, but also necessary. The point being made is that it is impossible for an individual to make an evaluation without looking at the kinds of actions which serve as evidence to him. What he sees as an evaluation is right and correct within the context of his own mind. It may or may not be right or wrong in terms of the state-defined moral code. The concept of morality now enters into the question of evaluations. Adherence to moral codes places obligations on the individual to evaluate situations and to react in a manner acceptable to the society.

A person who holds to the highest principles is one who observes a situation, makes an evaluation, draws a set of principles from it, and then tries to pass those principles on to others. This framework is seen as a process of establishing principles, the problem being that if one fails to accept the principle, it can never become part of the moral code. The difference between those who do or do not hold to the principles is a question of moral and non-moral points of view.<sup>38</sup>

The rules of evidence form the basis for making evaluation and as such, there is a close tie between statements of facts and statements of value. Whether words used are either descriptive or commendatory, the fact remains



that the basis upon which individuals will make their evaluations must be upon some observable criteria. The moral principles are established by evaluative acts to determine if they are acceptable to oneself. It is a question of determining whether the principle is acceptable within the context of the moral code of the society.

It would appear that Foot's arguments in support of naturalism are valid for in the absence of other means of making moral decisions, especially as they relate to feelings and the development of attitudes, it would seem logical that moral conclusions are based upon statements of facts. Emotivists and intuitionists maintain a different point of view which will be examined later. Their claim is that moral principles must be examined from a higher plane than simply from observing something in the natural world.

Naturalism argues that all things are part of the natural order. There seems to be credence to the argument that evaluations are drawn from observing what occurs in the natural environments.



### Chapter III: Intuitionism Theory

One of the major arguments against the naturalism position was advanced by G.E. Moore. Moore claimed that moral judgment could not be based upon facts alone and that the word 'good' is undefinable because it does not contain natural, definable properties, although it is an evaluation term. The word 'good' is used in a general manner by a person who gives approval to something. One may say that the lunch is 'good' or that he is a 'good boy' or simply, 'it is good'. The word is evaluative and while Moore is correct in stating that good has no definable properties; it represents an attempt by a person to attach a degree of approval to a person, object or situation. The degree of approval is not defined by the person when he utters, 'this is good' but it is a commonly understood process by all who hear the explanation, that the person has gone through a process of evaluation, making a judgment which is positive and affirmative. A person does not say 'this is good' unless he has a very clear idea of what object or property he is evaluating.

The argument against naturalism based upon the premise that evaluative judgments are made in the absence of facts extends to other words which are considered undefinable such as 'pleasure' and 'yellow'. While Moore argues that such words are not definable and therefore cannot represent





a natural object, one must agree that these words do have meaning, even if in a sense only to the individual. When I make a statement that 'it is good' or 'it is pleasant', I have a very clear idea what the object or situation is about which I am making an evaluatory judgment. When something is approved as satisfactory, it can be proclaimed as good. Good, pleasant and other so-called undefinable words naturally do not have properties, but they are used to communicate an evaluation or feeling about something which is observable and does have natural properties. These words then permit one to express a general feeling about some observable phenomenon.

Moore recognizes that when one thinks of something being good, he is attaching an intrinsic value or worth to the particular object or situation. While a person cannot define good as he would define a table, my contention is that there is no need to consider good in terms of its definability. It has been previously stated that the word good is related to the evaluation of some object or occurrence, it indicates approval to some degree, and it has meaning to the individual. Therefore, it is my belief that Moore's contention that naturalism can be disproved on the basis that evaluative words do not contain natural properties is an overstated proposition.

Moore makes several generalizations in his objections to naturalism, namely that naturalism offers no reason whatsoever for any ethical principle, and that it fails to



satisfy the requirements of ethics as a scientific study. He further argues that if one accepts the premise that good conduct is desirable, then the conclusion will be reached that good conduct is conducive to general happiness. One may argue that the aim of ethics is to ensure a general level of happiness. He argues that naturalism forces one to look around in a narrow sense of good conduct and happiness as basic aims of ethical judgments when in fact, a person should look around with a free and open mind. Moore suggests that if a person looks around with a definition of good in mind, one will be examining the environment within the context of good having properties and will concentrate on discovering what those properties are.<sup>39</sup>

It is difficult to agree with the argument that naturalism offers no reasons for ethical principles. Naturalism suggests that ethical judgments can be formulated upon observing some situation or natural object and as such, does offer a basis for ethical judgments. He assumes that naturalism forces one into a definition of good. Granted naturalism does force one into a definition of the occurrences that happen around oneself, and does so as a means of asking the questions of 'is it right or wrong, good or bad?' In order to examine scientifically my question one must observe, and what one observes must be defined in some manner. When I observe a certain phenomenon, an evaluation is spontaneously made and I define in my mind,



my approval or condemnation of the occurrence. If I utter a word to indicate my evaluation, I may use any one of a number of words to define my feeling about the occurrence. My contention is that naturalism may force one into definitions of occurrences as good or bad, but it does so in a normal process of making evaluative judgments. Moore seems to imply that one approaches an evaluation of something from the viewpoint of preconceived definitions, and hence one should approach the evaluation with an open mind. I agree that one's repository of evaluations should not cloud judgment in the evaluation of a particular action. There is nothing artificially restrictive about defining something as it is a natural human process. All persons have structures or codes by which all actions are evaluated. I maintain that one observes a situation or occurrence and as part of the evaluation defines it. Moore suggests one carries predetermined definitions and matches them to some occurrences. I would suggest that naturalism is a theory which permits one to examine a situation and proclaim an evaluation. The evaluation may match one's predetermined definitions, but nevertheless the evaluation was made on the basis of observation of natural properties. If I observe some occurrence, I will evaluate it in my mind and then define it. From the occurrence I will determine whether it is good or bad and define it as such. Something cannot be defined to be good or bad without a due evaluation.





The argument is further advanced by Moore, that when something is judged to be good, one judges its particular effect and that the effect will be good. The premise is that this is a causal judgment and universal truths are difficult to formulate from causal judgments.<sup>40</sup>

When one makes an evaluation that something is good, naturally one is defining the effect of the action. If I observe something and declare it to be good, then I would say that the effects of that action would be good or make me or others feel good. Certainly it is a judgment. However I must question Moore's contention that defining something to be good is done so in a causal manner. I have previously stated that the definition of something is a natural consequence of evaluating the action or natural object. Making an evaluation brings together every subjective and objective criterion which a person applies to a decision. Therefore, the judgments are causal and the question is one of whether the judgments, given the same situations, are consistent and provide for framing universal truths.

Naturally the judgments differ somewhat in their conclusions because evaluations are subjective. However, so called universal truths are derived from generalizations formed from judgments about certain situations. If I observe a certain conduct such as a person helping another, I may conclude that charity is a desirable virtue. I have observed, evaluated and defined the virtue and similar



actions are defined in the same manner. If others reach a similar conclusion, then a generalized truth emerges.

Naturalism argues for precise scientific enquiry in the determination of evaluations based upon natural properties. If Moore's argument against naturalism is based upon the premise that anything judged to be good is a causal judgment and universal truths can not be determined, then I strongly disagree with the premise. Firstly, this premise does not refute naturalism as a means of reaching ethical judgments because in order to reach even causal judgments, some natural property must be observed. Secondly, naturalism specifies that precise scientific enquiry must be used to reach universally accepted conclusions.

Moore has maintained in his arguments, that naturalism presumes an objectivity in making value judgments, and that such a case is impossible. In examining the question, 'what things are good', he enunciates a principle that 'the value of such a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts'. This principle specifies that there are a good number of things which have intrinsic value, many things that are bad and a larger class of things which appear indifferent. A thing belonging to these classes may include two or more of the parts in its whole. The argument continues that a thing formed of a good and an indifferent part has greater value than the good thing itself possesses.<sup>41</sup>

I say that this argument presumes an objectivity in



the sense that it appears to follow some law very much like the natural laws. But Moore has always argued against the objective notion that any judgment can be based upon observable natural phenomena. In enunciating this principle, he appears to condone the naturalism approach which he actively opposes.

The difficulty is always in determining what one means by 'good' or 'bad'. Defining 'good', 'bad' or 'indifferent' is a matter of personal evaluations. However, it is conceivable that things are comprised of elements having an intrinsic value established by the person making an evaluation, as well as some things having bad or indifferent characteristics. One would presuppose that a thing having indifferent characteristics would be something which fails to engender any evaluation from some person. Nevertheless, while we can agree with the premise that 'good', 'bad' or 'indifferent' characteristics do exist, it is difficult to determine what these characteristics might be as they defy definition. This matter of definability is one of Moore's major weapons against the naturalism theory. To quote Moore; "the value of the whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts."

As an example, Moore illustrates the case where an object and consciousness of the object form parts of the whole 'beautiful object'. No matter how conscious one may be of an object, the part of the value which the consciousness attributes to the whole 'beautiful object' is proportionately





less than the value of the whole objects.<sup>42</sup>

To further disprove naturalism, the argument centers on the premise that good denotes a simple quality and, that not one but many things possess this quality. This premise which forms the basis of the 'naturalistic fallacy', presumes that all properties contain a property, namely good.<sup>43</sup>

It is difficult to believe that a person will accept the fact that good denotes a simple quality, or indeed, that good itself contains properties. As I have previously argued, when one declares something to be good, there is the premise of degrees of approval. It is incorrect for anyone to define the absolute state of 'good' in terms of the object or situation, for everyone has a different perspective of how good something is. Furthermore, a person does not attempt to communicate to another how good something is, but rather declares something to be good, without consideration of its properties, as an indication of one's approval of something. Good is a word which is used to communicate one's approval of something and therefore is not considered by persons to refer to properties.

If this is the case, then what of the main argument against naturalism, that is, the undefinability of good? The argument against naturalism cannot be based upon this simple premise for good is a word used in our language to express something without a great deal of thought whether or not it acts as an adjective or noun. If I say it is a good car, I am not concerned about how good the car is, only that



it meets with my approval. If I say, 'it is good', again, I am only admitting that it is not bad. If I wish to qualify the properties of an object further, I must use means other than the expression 'good'. 'Good' is an expression similar to using 'ouch' to express pain. This expression does not define the degree of pain, it only admits pain is present.

Naturalism is defined by Moore to be a theory of ethics in which good consists in some properties at some point in time and itself can be defined by reference to such properties. He argues further that 'natural' denotes something related to nature and that nature defines that which is good is considered to be normal. The argument suggests that many things which are not good are not normal.<sup>44</sup> The argument continues that naturalism denotes something good when we speak of natural affections and here nature is meant, not so much as something normal, but as a substance of what is needed as a necessity of life. Moore argues that although certain acts are necessary for the preservation of life, there is no need to praise them. The argument that something is good because it is natural and bad because it is unnatural is fallacious as a systematic approach to ethics. Evaluation is an important consideration as it shows the direction which we are developing and gives some insight into the way we should develop. It is important because it is based upon the premise of natural selection, but as well, it is linked to the study of ethics in that ethics deals with conduct and to understand conduct, one must



examine the evolution of conduct. Universal conduct emerges at the highest stages of evolution and is exhibited by persons who display the highest kind of conduct by being forced to live with others in groups. Ethical conduct gains sanctions as it begins to display certain characteristics.<sup>45</sup> This is a position put forth by Spencer, and Moore criticizes it as a fallacy on the basis that one cannot presume a connection between conduct and natural evolution.

What does one mean by universal conduct? Inasmuch as man evolves through a natural evolution he has not only developed and adapted to his surroundings in a physical sense, but also in a social sense. As the culture matures its members develop rules of conduct that serve as the standard upon which all behaviors are judged. Some members may elect not to adhere to the standards which place the society at large in a dilemma. It must review the standard for acceptability, or must confirm its acceptability by demanding that all members adhere to the standard. The standard is constantly under evaluation, and as the society continues to develop its institutions, generally accepted codes of conduct emerge. For the community or society in question, we may refer to conduct under these accepted standards as universal conduct.

Moore argues that a simple consideration of the course which evolution takes is not sufficient to inform us of the course which we ought to pursue. One must examine all aspects of evolution to distinguish the less valuable from





the more valuable in order to determine if a theory of evolution gives any assistance to the study of ethics.<sup>46</sup>

What then are the main premises of this argument as it relates to naturalism? It presumes that one should move in the direction of evolution because that is the right direction. It also presumes that the forces of nature move a person in the right direction. Therefore, the naturalistic fallacy is to presume that nature is on the side of the good.

In examining naturalism, some key points emerge. Naturalism insists the good must be examined in terms of the properties or by reference to the properties of something in nature. If I say 'it is good because . . .', I have a conception of why I like something.

Natural affections are an outgrowth of nature itself and should be praised as good. There is no fallacy in recognizing that it is from nature itself that natural affections evolve. The culture determines the importance placed upon compassion and concern about one's fellow human beings. There is the natural tendency to feel a high degree of affection for one's relatives and immediate family members. Indeed, living in a community of fellow creatures demands that certain behaviors are necessary to give order to the society. These behaviors are accepted as normal and good for the group as a whole, and indeed are considered to be natural in themselves. The question one may ask is whether ethics is founded in natural evolution. I disagree



with the arguments that the relationship between natural evolution and ethics is a fallacy.

Indeed Spencer's argument on the relationship between evolution of conduct has merit. In Darwin's 'Laws of Natural Evolution', the maxim is that only the strongest physically and mentally survive. In human evolution, the weakest also survive, but in order to give order to the society and give persons some idea how they should relate to each other, rules of conduct must exist. These rules of conduct evolve as time and circumstances change, to meet situations not previously foreseen, with some permanently adopted by the culture as being desirable. This process of evolution in determining conduct, looks at all aspects of the changing culture and adjusts to new definitions of that which is acceptable and therefore desirable. It is desirable because through the process of evaluation, by examining the implications of certain actions on the total group, a common code of conduct is developed, albeit it changes constantly, and is declared to be good at a point in time.

It appears that my argument now turns a full circle to support the premise that something is good because it refers to properties of something else. This is quite correct. I have argued that defining properties of good is irrelevant as any kind of ethical argument, but I support the notion that a declaration of good is based upon observation of some natural properties. What I see, I will evaluate as being



good or bad. As well, I will act in a certain manner which may or may not be in accordance with codes of conduct. If it is not, it is judged bad, but this is not to detract from the argument that codes of conduct do exist and evolve through the sum total of human experiences. Does this mean it is good? Of course not, it is simply that the society judges the conduct to be good as part of accepting it, but as part of learning, adjustments will take place, as conducts are added or dropped based upon actions and experiences and people's attitudes towards them. Natural evolution plays an important role in the determination of what is right and wrong, bad or good, as a process where man judges those actions which give order to the culture.

I would like to briefly consider Moore's arguments regarding metaphysical ethics as it seems to give a good argument against basing value judgments upon something which one would call a natural object. Ethical judgments based upon objects containing natural properties have been considered with Moore's conclusion that one cannot, for a variety of reasons, base value judgments solely on observing nature. I have refuted his objections, basing my arguments on the premise the naturalism cannot be refuted because of an undefinability of good. I also have recognized that good does exist in one's mind in an undefinable state. On this basis, I might be classified as being a metaphysician.

To examine metaphysics, there is the argument that there are things which are good and exist in mental life.





Moore states that it is this class of objects whose properties cannot be defined by nature, that he includes the adjective 'good'. There are things which have no observable properties but do relate to things which represent universal truths and he uses the example of the number two which when added to two, gives the universal truth, four.<sup>47</sup>

Moore defined metaphysics in terms of "non-natural objects or qualities, that is, objects or qualities that are constituents of the universe but not of temporal events (nature)." He viewed things in the universe in terms of those which do exist, and are observable and those which are, but do not exist observably. Moore distinguishes between these two categories in three ways; those things that exist have being and can be described whereas those things that do not exist cannot have being or be described. Thirdly, if things only exist as imaginary objects and do not exist in observable form, then they exist only as thoughts.

In terms of being, "Moore distinguished between three kinds of objects: particulars, truths or facts, and universals." Particulars were seen as material things, truths as true beliefs such as mathematical equations and universals as relations and relational properties. Examples of universals are numbers and non-natural qualities such as 'good'.<sup>48</sup>

The argument continues that metaphysics describes the Supreme Good in terms of something that does exist in the supersensible reality but not in nature. Something which



is perfectly good exists by displaying characteristics possessed by the supersensible reality, but is not natural. This premise forms the basis of recognizing ethical principles in terms of the perfect goodness, a quality which cannot be described in terms of what exists in the present. The argument continues that metaphysics implies the question 'what is real' and in turn implies 'what is good'. The conclusion on the nature of the ideal good cannot be established except by considering whether the ideal is real. According to Moore, to derive what is good, in itself, from statements of what is real is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.<sup>49</sup>

I do not deny that there are things which exist in the mental life and for which one has firm opinions based upon feelings. These opinions may be reflected in universal truths such as those which evolve through religion. I also do not argue that metaphysics is a study of something which is not part of nature, but for the purpose of this topic, I find it difficult to believe that metaphysics plays an important role in refuting naturalism. Unquestionably, I come to conclusions about something which is good or bad, right or wrong. But it is not something which is derived from, or even exists in the absence of, nature. It is difficult to remotely determine what is meant by the phrase 'it is good in itself'. Indeed, it is meaningless for how can anything be good or bad unless there is some basis upon which to make such a declaration.



If metaphysics implies 'what is real' as a basic premise of determining 'what is good', then I have faith in metaphysics as a means of determining values. I may say that 'this is good', and I may mean that this is good in itself. It may, in the extreme sense, be real in terms of accepting the 'universal truth' as defined by the culture.

However, in other cases, my judgments reflect my perceptions of reality. If I say 'he is a good boy' I must have some very clear premise as to why he is a good boy. Was it something he did or said? One can argue that the existence of the boy, and the consequences of his actions are certainly observable in nature, the main premise then being why is it good. Introspection, and the demands of the society, learned after centuries of experimentation, have determined the good or appropriate behaviors. A philosopher may contemplate on whether something is or is not good, but to do so, he must examine this question in terms of the consequences of the actions. One does contemplate good and what is good by observing what happens in reality. There must be some action which gives one good reason why it is good or not good. I can question whether something is bad when others might believe it to be good. But this forces one back into reality because an evaluation cannot be made until one observes the effects of a different action. I have the power to feel that something is good. But to argue that one can simply declare something to be good in the absence of consequences, is to deny any grounds for





making judgments.

Frankena contends that the naturalistic fallacy is connected with the distinction between 'ought' and 'is', 'value' and 'fact'. It centers on the notion that 'ought' is derived from 'is'. For the intuitionists, this notion is unacceptable for they believe that ethical conclusions cannot be drawn from premises which are non-ethical. More precisely, the intuitionist's beliefs can be expressed in three statements; ethical propositions are not deducible from non-ethical ones; ethical characteristics are not definable in terms of non-ethical ones, and; ethical characteristics are different in kind from non-ethical ones.<sup>50</sup>

Whereas purely intuitive definitions of ethical principles can be formed, such as those of right and pleasure, it is nonsense to presume that ethical propositions are deducible from non-ethical ones. Indeed, I have maintained that while words such as good might be intuitive, any notion of why something is good is directly related to natural properties. Otherwise, there cannot be a definition of good or any other ethical term.

Ethical characteristics are not different than non-ethical ones for how also can one define an ethical premise except in terms of natural properties? I agree with Moore that good is undefinable in terms of containing natural properties; however, I disagree that it is a good argument against naturalism. Good is definable only in terms of general feelings or the qualities of the natural properties.



If I say that he is a good boy, he is not good because he is good, he is good because I approve of his actions in some way.

Frankena contends that the three statements do not represent a naturalistic fallacy as much as it is a definist fallacy. The definist fallacy is defined as the process of confusing two properties or defining or substituting one property for another. It further states that it is the process of confusing two properties with one.<sup>51</sup>

A definist fallacy does not exist as ethical propositions can be defined by non-ethical ones. Goodness is undefinable unless it is used to describe the characteristics of some object or occurrence. The intuitionists may hold to the position that they have a view of the simple, unique quality or relation of goodness or rightness but their inability to define it in a unique manner leads me to believe that such a revelation does not exist.

Searle presents a counter-argument to the thesis that one cannot derive 'ought' from 'is'. The argument centers on the premise that the evaluations can be derived from the descriptive by examining an objective, factual statement. It is worthwhile to examine this argument as one attempt to refute the traditional view that there exists a logical gulf between evaluative statements and descriptive statements. A descriptive statement, such as, 'he has a good car' is not considered evaluative by the intuitionists. An opinion may exist as to the factual conditions under which a car is indeed good or bad. Evaluative statements, under this view, do not indicate



a statement may be considered to be true or false. The evaluative statement is based upon a subjective premise rather than objective reality.

However, the counter argument centers its proof on the premise that uttering certain objective words such as 'I promise', leads one to a state of obligation and therefore to what one ought to do. The argument continues that if I utter a statement that I promise to do something, then it is only logical that I ought to do it. It must be noted that this argument assumes that promises ought to be kept.<sup>52</sup>

Searle recognizes several possible objections to this counter-argument, the first being that there must be an evaluative assumption in the descriptive statement, and the second, that the derivation rests upon the premise that one ought to keep one's promises. However, the argument concludes that 'ought' can be derived from 'is' because evaluative premises are based upon descriptive situations.<sup>53</sup> If I were to taste something and declare it to be good, and another person sees it as not good, I am entitled to try to change his mind, but one thing is certain, we have formed different evaluations. Based upon either conclusion, the person will decide what he ought to do when confronted with a similar substance. Further, each will possibly advise others on what they ought to do under similar circumstances.

This argument does, in a linguistic sense, somewhat justify the premise that 'ought' may be derived from 'is' although it is not based upon an extensive foundation but





only one example. As long as one accepts the premise that one ought to meet one's obligations, then the argument is valid. There is validity in the counter-argument as it were, that there is a suggested evaluative assumption in the descriptive statement. But as long as accepted institutional rules of behavior exist, this conclusion will be drawn whenever statements are made.

Where the 'ought' from 'is' argument does break down is that it gives no indication if value judgments are made in the absence of descriptive situations. It assumes that all evaluations are made from observing factual situations and that new codes of conduct may be established from these observations. I am not totally discounting the notion that value judgments may be made from intuition or emotions; on the contrary, I have every reason to believe that many statements express our feelings without the immediate evidence from some object or situation.

Much of the argument against ethical naturalism was advanced by Moore, but two other philosophers are worthy of mention because of their contributions. H.A. Prichard centers his argument on the notion that man seeks proof of why he ought to act the way he is acting. He asks himself the question, 'why should I do these things?'. The moral question of why something should be done is expressed in terms of the person's happiness or the goodness of something.<sup>54</sup> This direction of thinking considers evaluative judgments to be based, not solely upon



observations, but rather upon reflection on what the implications of a particular action will be. It assumes that a person can conceptualize the consequences of the actions and based upon this data, will decide whether or not to take the action. One may argue, in favor of naturalism, that all actions are the result of all past learned experiences and therefore no person can objectively evaluate the consequences of an action without some past experience upon which to base future decisions.

One problem emerges, that doing something because it is good or right is no proof at all. One may be told that one should work towards a certain objective because it is for one's own happiness. However, this may fail to convince the individual that his action is good because it makes him happy. The central thesis of the argument is that if we fail to recognize an action as being good, then we will fail to recognize that we ought to do it. It is perhaps because of the difficulty in determining how one should act that preference is often given to the naturalism approach. I cannot find a basic disagreement with Prichard as there are actions which are motivated by some desire such as; affection, hate, charity, gratitude and public spirit. The argument suggests that certain actions are the consequence of an obligation, but that they are also the result of a desire to do something because one wants to do it. Moral codes are generally not strict to the extent that particular actions may be



carried out in any one of a number of ways.

Prichard argues that it is impossible to point out to a person the goodness or happiness which will result from taking some action. A person can only be told what the action is, then he must make up his mind whether or not it has some significance to him. Prichard uses duty as an example. A person may be told that doing something is his duty. Indeed, the consequences of the action may be described to him, but until he reaches that point where he decides whether or not he will do something, no one can predict his actions on the basis of duty. If one is to determine if one has any obligation to act under a certain situation, he will do so only upon encountering the situation and directly appreciating the results of his actions.

Ross disagreed with Prichard's doctrine of the self-evidence of our obligations on the basis that determining one's obligations will be a matter of self-evidence. As an example, he suggests that one may perform a duty because of obligations, but that circumstances may arise where another action may be performed, in which case a conflict of duties will occur.

Secondly, Ross was aware that if good and right were simple and intuitive properties, then it seems reasonable that whenever one considers good or right, it must possess one or the other of these properties and consideration of any other properties would be simply irrelevant. But Ross





argues that goodness cannot be identified as part of other properties nor can right be descriptive of an action without reference to other properties. Indeed, Ross argues that:

the goodness of a thing depends on its possession of certain other properties, that there are other features of an action which make it a right action. Goodness and rightness, then, according to Ross, though intuitable, must be regarded as 'dependent' or 'consequential' properties; they are not, as it were, stuck on objects like postage stamps, quite indifferently to any other features of those objects or actions, nor are other properties quite irrelevant to goodness and rightness.<sup>55</sup>

Prichard argued that obligations are self-evident whereas Ross suggests that conflicts over courses of actions as well as the premise that the goodness or rightness of a thing are dependent on other properties, leads one to conclude that obligations are difficult to define. Intuitively, a person may have a sense of duty. Conversely, he may have been conditioned by the culture. Duty and obligation are difficult to define in terms of good and right and unless a person reaches a conclusion, either within the framework of the culture's standards of duty or through some vague, "self-evidence", we are unlikely to reach a concise definition. Does this argue further for intuitionism? Only inasmuch as good and right are difficult to define relative to their properties. But Ross' counter argument tends to support the naturalism point of view.



#### Chapter IV: Emotivism Theory

Emotive analysis emerged in response to the recognition that naturalism did not necessarily answer all the questions on how value judgments might be made. It is a theory which suggests that certain words or statements are made simply to arouse in a listener, certain responses and to create a certain state of mind. Words are used to either simply convey information or arouse emotions and it is in this latter sense that language is considered to be emotive.<sup>56</sup>

The question of whether or not emotive language serves as the basis of making evaluative judgments was examined by Barnes. It is plausible to accept the premise that certain words create emotional feelings within a person, but it may not influence the making of a value judgment.<sup>57</sup> If I accept the notion that charity is a virtue, then my reflection of one being charitable may give me a good feeling. It might be argued that I have now made a value judgment or namely that one ought to be charitable. But I can only illustrate the judgment by translating this feeling into some action. In this case, although there may be many reasons why a feeling is invoked within oneself, one may decide against taking any action which will reinforce the notion that a value judgment has been made. I may feel



distressed when I observe someone starving, and I may feel that someone ought to do something in the name of charity, but I may decide against taking any personal action. Therefore, what relation can one draw between feeling strongly about something and making a value judgment? On what parameter does one determine whether a value judgment has been made? If I say 'I feel good', is that the exclamation of a feeling, or is it a value judgment? My initial inclination is to lean towards the former, however, a further look at emotivism may shed some light on this question.

Barnes held the view that value judgments were not judgments at all but rather simply exclamations of approval. It therefore follows that there must be a class of words which include emotive meaning, either with or without value disclosure. Urmson draws the conclusion, after examining various definitions of emotivism, that the connection between feelings and emotions, and the attitudes and actions is practically non-existent.<sup>58</sup>

Stevenson argues that the requirements for a "sense of goodness" are that; "goodness must be a topic for intellectual disagreement, it must be magnetic and it must not be discovered solely through scientific methods". He argues the first point on the premise that 'this is good' translates to 'I desire this' when in fact persons may declare something to be in the community good but it may not be individually desired.<sup>59</sup> Emotivism is a theory which seeks to respond to the deficiencies of naturalism. In





this instance, 'this is good' does not necessarily mean 'this is desired', on the contrary, it may mean 'I like it', or 'I approve of it' or any number of other phrases which do not imply action much as 'I desire it' does.

Stating that goodness has magnetism is to imply that a person will have a tendency to act in a direction which promotes the 'good'. This is undecidable in the absence of being able to define what is meant by the 'good'.

Finally, it implies that goodness cannot be discovered through scientific enquiry. More precisely, it divorces ethics from scientific methodology. One may argue that what is good is that which is accepted and approved by others. On the contrary, persons may take actions which one could deem to be not good.

Stevenson accepts the three requirements on the premise that ethical words do not simply describe the existing state of facts but they attempt to intensify or change a person's interests. The argument continues that words are used to either communicate beliefs or to express feelings.<sup>60</sup> If one uses the phrase 'to be succinct', it may communicate the intention to be concise, or it may indicate annoyance. Therefore, voice tone, gestures and general circumstances give some indication as to how one perceives the message. Where expressing feelings, a word has a general aura attached to it. When considering the emotive premise of a word, all factors are present. If I say "well, I don't know . . . ", when in fact I have concluded to myself that



I am not agreeing and therefore, will not be influenced in the direction which the speaker desires, I am hoping that he will perceive my signals that it is not advantageous for one to move in his direction.

The argument further considers that there may be agreement or disagreement in interest rather than belief. Stating that the 'pie is good' may be an attempt to convince another that the pie is good but it says nothing about the premise that all people ought to eat pie. A moral evaluation cannot be drawn from the premise that the pie tastes good.

The argument concludes that the empirical method is necessary only inasmuch as a determining factor in our interests. When one likes something, he usually has a factual basis upon which to base his liking. But, the empirical method is not sufficient for determining ethical judgments for agreement or disagreement will not solely depend upon implications of certain outcomes but, rather how persons feel about something.

This argument has merit on several important points; it recognizes that one attempts to influence others through the use of certain words, and it indicates a difference between interests and beliefs. The argument emphasizes that certain words will re-direct our interests because of the emotive nature of the word, but will not influence our beliefs. I do not strongly disagree that emotive words engender feelings and that these feelings are translated



into action. But there is no definite gap between the ethical and 'directive' context of these words. Feelings are communicated in any number of ways but 'the why' such feelings exist is the nature of ethics. One may simply have a good feeling about something because it makes one feel comfortable, pleasant or excited, but the belief is reinforced by experiencing something which engenders the belief. The empirical method is useful in that the consequences of one's actions will strengthen or eliminate the belief. But one asks, how does one know that the right belief exists even in the face of empirical evidence? The answer to this question is that one evaluates in one's own mind, how one feels about the consequences.

Stevenson argues for a conception of the personal decision which he claims to borrow from Dewey, Hobbes and Hume. The personal decision process is to determine whether or not someone approves of something. Approving of a particular action depends upon an evaluation of the consequences which is a cognitive process. Where a person is undecided about his beliefs, he must resolve these beliefs by reference to attitudes and dispositions.

This argument recognizes that some attitudes are particularly moral in contrast to those that are non-moral. It argues that primary moral beliefs are general dispositions about how one should act and which can only





be proven by analyzing the consequences of one's actions. The argument continues that there is a relationship between the emotive and the cognitive elements.<sup>61</sup>

This argument recognizes the cognitive process in making decisions and links this process with the person approving or disproving something by analyzing the consequences of the actions which one takes. But it also recognizes that there are some opinions or actions which are taken, not because one is capable of analyzing consequences of some actions, but rather because the interplay of one's feelings and attitudes indicates how one should behave. This is a position which recognizes neither the pure cognitive nor emotive aspect of making judgments.

Stevenson further argues that the emotive concept of ethics does not deprive ethics of its thoughtful reflective elements, but on the contrary, has the opposite effect. For example, it may be that the consideration of whether something is good or bad depends upon the degree to which it increases or decreases the chances of survival of the society. There may exist a conflict between the cognitive and emotive considerations when evaluating a certain course of action. Certain conducts may be considered to be for the good of all persons, however, it may inhibit personal freedom to an extent which is unacceptable to the individual. From the cognitive viewpoint, the action which specifies the collective good for survival of the society may inhibit



individual freedoms.<sup>62</sup>

In order to examine the worth of the emotive approach, Stevenson assumes emotive meaning refers to certain words which evoke or express attitudes. I believe this view to be rather limiting as it implies that an attitude must be formed about something. It seems specific when in fact, a person confronted by a set of circumstances will develop certain feelings which may then become more ingrained into basic attitudes. Attitudes are a characteristic which one carries with oneself and are developed from a complex set of interactions with people and circumstances in the environment. While I am tending towards John Dewey's theories, it seems logical that attitudes are to a large extent, influenced by experiences. Feelings about something are an instantaneous response, attitudes are developed characteristics which are developed through the cognitive processes.

Stevenson recognizes this concern by viewing man's ethical terms as either expressing attitudes or designating attitudes. By defining attitudes in this way, Stevenson argues that designating attitudes simply describes man's state of mind whereas expressing attitudes leads to a pure emotive examination of the question.<sup>63</sup>

But how does Stevenson reconcile the view that emotive meaning will enhance the cognitive approach to evaluations? Quite simply, he argues that man will give reasons for his judgments and hence, the cognitive aspect. However,



judgments are based upon how one evaluates something and evaluations are founded upon beliefs, feelings and attitudes. The cognition is then enhanced by the emotive only inasmuch as the beliefs are delegated to the reasons and not the judgments. That is, the beliefs form part of the evaluations and give reasons for the evaluations but they do not form part of the judgment. The emotive view presumes that a person will re-examine reasons for doing something in a certain manner. The impetus for change does not always come from thinking about the shortcomings of a certain course of action. Indeed, change is often initiated by general feelings that the situation is not as it should be and that a change is necessary. The non-emotive analyst will attempt to examine ethics by evaluating cognitively the consequences of actions without recognizing that evaluations are founded in the emotions as well.

There is a distinction between beliefs and attitudes according to Stevenson. The emotive theory recognizes that certain words will arouse favorable or unfavorable feelings and attitudes. It is not the purpose of a person to change another person's beliefs, indeed these beliefs may form part of the very nature of a person. It is the attitudes of a person which one wishes to alter. By altering a person's attitudes towards something, regardless of his beliefs, it is hoped that his conduct will be changed.

This is quite different from the position of the other theories which viewed words as merely descriptive.





The emotivist insists that what makes a judgment moral in regard to any individual is "that the terms applied to him also express and induce a favorable attitude toward him, and both evince and arouse certain feelings towards that person."<sup>64</sup>



## Chapter V: Conclusion One

In examining the naturalism non-naturalism dichotomy an attempt to determine how value judgments are made, it is obvious that no single argument or theory will provide an answer to the question. Foot argued that naturalism was a sound theory upon which to make ethical judgments. The argument was centered on the premise that two persons will view factual occurrences in different ways. Physical objects or phenomena will be interpreted differently by persons in making ethical judgments. Furthermore, a person observing the natural state of things may fail to draw any evaluative conclusions. While it was agreed that different persons will arrive at different evaluations from identical natural phenomena, I found the second argument to be a weak defense of naturalism. It seems logical that some kind of an evaluation will occur under all circumstances. Nevertheless, the major premise is that ethical evaluations will follow from thinking about what one has observed and that evaluations logically follow. Foot did not consider the impact of beliefs and attitudes, an approach which was left for Stevenson to follow.

Stevenson, at times, appears to argue the cognitive approach and then returns to the emotive theory as a framework for making ethical judgments. His cognitive



approach, which implies support for naturalism, is centered on the notion that man gives reasons why evaluative judgments are made and should be accepted by others.

Hare also argues that persons will observe the same phenomena, but that each person makes individual evaluative judgments.

Proponents of naturalism object to the notion that naturalism can be disproved on the basis of the indefinability of certain words which in themselves contain no natural properties. Dewey in particular, argued that empirical methods could be used to arrive at ethical judgments. This argument centered on the premise that a theory of values must be connected with concrete experiences. It suggests that analytical techniques can be used to arrive at ethical judgments by centering one's attention upon the consequences of any actions. This position is criticized by opponents of naturalism on the basis that empirical analyses are not sufficient as a means of making evaluations.

The brief review of the naturalism theory leads one to several conclusions. This theory argues that all ethical judgments are made from observing occurrences which have natural properties. It does not argue for a consistent ethical judgment nor does it argue for the establishment of standard values in the society. It only argues that ethical judgments are derived from observing natural phenomena. The naturalism theory is a cognitive theory, emphasizing that





reason is paramount in arriving at ethical judgments.

Non-naturalists argue on the basis of an emotive or intuitive approach to explaining how one makes ethical judgments. Moore argued against naturalism on the basis that certain words such as 'good' are undefinable. I would disagree with this approach on the basis that the naturalistic theory cannot be refuted simply by contending that certain evaluative words do not contain natural properties. The argument also considers all things to contain something good as part of its properties. The degree of goodness will vary from one situation to another. I would argue that defining properties of good is irrelevant as the basis for any kind of an ethical argument, but I support the notion that a declaration of something being good is based upon an observation of some natural properties.

Moore bases his metaphysical argument upon the premise that ethical principles are advanced on the notion of universal truths. It asserts that something is good unto itself and should be accepted as such without the rigors of examination. This argument forms the basis of the intuitive theory, namely that certain principles, such as religious principles, are to be accepted for what they are and no more. I do not argue that such principles do indeed exist, however, I cannot support the contention that this is an effective argument against naturalism.

Other arguments against naturalism center on the



following notions; first that 'ought' is not derived from 'is' or in other words, that values cannot be derived from facts. Intuitionists do not accept the argument that ethical conclusions can be drawn from non-ethical ones. I do not agree with the argument and maintain that 'ought' may be derived from 'is'. Searle counter-argues the 'ought' from 'is' question with the contention that when one utters words which have no physical properties such as 'I promise', it implies an obligation which leads one to what ought to be done. The point is that evaluations may be made from descriptive situations, which further serves to support naturalism. The 'ought' from 'is' argument assumes, in accordance with naturalism, that all ethical judgments can be derived from observed properties. There are sound premises upon which to declare that naturalism cannot in itself explain how value judgments are made, indeed, there does exist a general attitude about what represents the collective good that serves to intuitively direct a person in reaching ethical conclusions. The major deficiency of the intuitive theory is in determining the degree of something's goodness.

Prichard argued in this way, stating that man seeks proof of why he is acting the way he is. A man will question his action in terms of whether it is good or right, but all arguments are irrelevant because we cannot define their properties. Therefore, a man will only know if his action is good or right when he carries out the



action. It will then become self-evident as to what is a right or good action.

But the intuitive theorists maintain that the ethical judgment is derived, not from observing some natural object, but from an intuitive sense of what is good, right, bad, or wrong. It argues that these words represent principles upon which one makes judgments, but the principles are contained within the mental being. A person has a very real conception of what is good, and makes a comparison of the action to the conception under all circumstances. The theory says nothing about how one arrives at the conception of good or duty, only that a person is quite capable of doing so. While the naturalistic theory leads one from the natural object to the evaluation, the intuitive theory moves in the opposite direction. One must agree that evaluations are made from observing natural properties. One must also agree that there exists in one's mind preconceived notions of what constitutes good or bad. The weakness in the process is twofold, namely, how can the observation of natural properties engender evaluation in terms of the kind or degree of evaluation, and further where have the preconceived notions of ethical values, as promoted by the intuitionists, been derived? The emotive theory attempts to answer these questions.

Emotive theorists suggest that certain words create feelings within a person and therefore arouse value judgments. Stevenson argues that words will change a person's beliefs and attitudes. The premise that words will influence





other persons is plausible as it is a normal function of our language. But Stevenson recognizes that the notion that words engender feelings, and therefore move persons to make evaluations, falls short of explaining how judgments are made. To account for this deficiency, he describes the interplay between the emotive and naturalist positions. As each theory has been described in relationship to naturalism, it is useful to determine if any exists between intuitionism and emotivism.

Intuitionism argues that certain words are intrinsically universal. They are accepted for their ethical connotations and influence ethical judgments. Emotivism states that words arouse feelings and develop attitudes. It seems reasonable that the very words which arouse feelings are the same universal principles, expressed in words, which one intuitively feels represent the ethical truth. Naturalism then, ties back to these two theories in that it provides a base upon which one reacts intuitively and from which one tests emotive principles.

There exist words like duty, patriotic, and democracy which create certain feelings. There are also the universal principles upon which society is structured. However, it is necessary to examine the consequences of actions in the natural environment to prove or disprove our belief in universal truths. One will evaluate based upon natural circumstances, but will do so only through an interplay between one's beliefs and an intuitive sense of what is



good or bad, right or wrong.



## Chapter VI: Discussion in Moral Education

The preceding section examined three theories which endeavor to explain how moral judgments are made. This treatise makes no attempt to be all-encompassing, but rather will briefly examine the relationships between ethics and education inasmuch as the latter is concerned with aims and values. In Chapter I, the question was: 'how are value judgments made?' In this chapter, the question continues to be about the way in which value judgments are made and justified. This premise leads to the further question of whether values often accepted in the education system ought to be questioned. If, indeed, they are questioned, then what skills or criteria are necessary in order for one to examine existing values?

When a teacher expects a certain mode of conduct or attitude from the students, he is defining values which determine the behavior of the student. This does not imply that the student understands the rationale behind the values. Indeed, in the rapidly changing educational environment, there is a strong likelihood that he will not accept values without open questioning. This requires the teacher to reflect upon the values which he/she asks others to accept.

Naturalism is a theory which presupposes that a value judgment is made in a rational manner by observing facts. I have argued previously that the consequences of an action





really serve as the justification in making a moral judgment. But the relevancy of the consequence is determined only by some principle upon which a comparison is made. The moral principle now becomes the action guiding factor in human behavior. A major problem is that in using words like 'good', there is no concise definition as to what constitutes 'good conduct'.

In response to this problem, the intuition theory emerged with the claim that the rightness of the principle is a matter of 'seeing' or 'grasping' some quality. This theory covers the main weakness of naturalism in its inability to determine which principles are moral and ethical. However, intuitionism also fails to explain how a person determines meaning of certain qualities which are claimed to be of the highest principles and serve to guide conduct.

To explain the arbitrary tendency of intuitionism, another theory, referred to as emotivism, emerged. This theory recognized that words arouse feelings and opinions and that any sense of morality must come from the emotions. The word 'murder' means nothing in itself, but the feelings it engenders cause one to reach certain conclusions about morality and ethics. The weakness of this theory is that the general feeling about what is good or bad, right or wrong, must be explicitly linked to some principle in order to give an ethical context to the feeling. Furthermore, actions also create feelings so that what is observed in the



natural environment will create feelings leading to moral judgments. In all things ethical, none of the three theories in isolation succeeds in determining how moral judgments are made on a rational basis, an awareness basis, or a general feeling about something. The fact remains that certain conduct is demanded in the educational setting, and that there must be reasons for specific conducts. Having reached this conclusion, as well as the position that ethical judgments are reached by means of all three processes, one encounters difficulties in defining not only how principles of conduct are reached, but how they are justified. Moral philosophy must attempt to bridge the gap between the evaluation of social values and the study of the nature of such values. Unquestionably, societies develop moral codes and principles which they expect their participants to adhere to. Therefore, it is common, in a society, that education is oriented towards inculcating principles and the nature of ethical philosophy is to examine the principles by whatever means or theories are available. It is in this setting that we ask whether reasoning or emotions form the basis for making value judgments.

But moral philosophy has limitations in its contribution to moral education. I cannot justify what values are good or right but rather can only "clarify alternative positions on such issues and to argue for one position rather than another." The moral philosopher can only clarify assumptions and indicate which actions or programs are consistent with



those assumptions.<sup>65</sup> There is no methodology by which moral philosophy can approach the examination of values. It does not describe the development of the child as this is the domain of psychology. Nor does it develop specific pedagogic principles which may or may not be related to values, but are always related to conduct.<sup>66</sup>

The importance of a moral upbringing is highlighted by Hare, who claims the inculcation of moral principles will serve as an objective moral law, by which a person may rationally or intuitively ascertain what he should do. Adults, including educators, teach principles upon which moral decisions are made. Principles should not be dogmatic, but rather should be modified or abandoned, depending upon the changing environment.

This argument recognizes the existence of a base of principles and suggests that a person has the capability to evaluate the justification for principles. A society constantly changes values throughout time which suggests that some process exists whereby some persons actively question the established social principles which guide conduct.<sup>67</sup>

Hare further argues in favor of the 'theory of universalizability' whereby a moral principle applies to all persons under all circumstances. The child, according to Hare, must not blindly accept principles, but must learn to examine the principles in order to determine what is morally acceptable to him/her. How do the children learn to examine principles - by functioning in an environment in contact with as many





persons as possible, by observing the actions of others, and wishing to follow their example?

This premise is largely unfounded as it counters the premise upon which moral judgments are made. If one accepts the premise that one should examine principles to assess their worth, simply interacting with large numbers of persons will not allow one to achieve this end. The mass society has relatively homogeneous values, depending upon the culture. This culture creates a significant inertia to any change to established value systems. From an early age, the child is bombarded with identical principles so that while he may question why different values apply to the young, in general, he accepts the fact that those values guide his conduct at a point in time. Therefore, the environment serves to constantly reinforce established principles rather than create a forum for examination of values. This is not to say that principles of morality are not examined in the classroom, only that the same conclusions are reached as in the society.

Conversely, expectations that adults will set an example for learning moral principles reinforces the argument that the young will simply adopt accepted values. Adults, whether parents or educators, have a very clear conception of what constitutes acceptable moral behavior at various levels of development, and exert pressures within controlled social and classroom environments to ensure such behavior is achieved. This is not to imply that educators



and parents do not radically question basic moral principles. In all likelihood they do, but in endeavoring to control the activities and behaviors of the young, an extremely conservative approach is taken. Principles of conduct, moral in the sense that behavior is controlled, are taught to ensure that through general acceptances of values and a homogeneous group attitude, individual conflict is minimized. The ideal young adolescent believes in the ideals of the culture, principles of fairness, freedom and justice, is polite and respectful. The point is that because of the conservatism of educators and the need to prescribe codes of conduct, with few exceptions, neither the family nor the classroom setting provide the opportunity to examine moral principles.

Wilson holds the view that it is difficult to determine what type of education is necessary unless one knows what constitutes a morally educated person. This view holds that certain features are essential to morality, namely that overt behavior in itself is not sufficient as every action must be connected to a moral reason for acting. Good moral reasons must be based upon rational considerations of other people's interests. Further moral principles emerge from this rational examination of respecting the interests of others.<sup>68</sup>

I have referred to this argument as quite typical in terms of the approach to moral education. It presumes that a morally educated person understands the reasons for



actions which he may take within the context of established moral principles. It implies that the morally educated person has not 'learned' to examine from first principles the validity of a moral principle but rather rationally examines whether his actions violate the moral principles as they are defined for the culture. Indeed, Wilson states that a man must determine whether he is committed to his principles. This further illustrates that there is an emphasis on examining one's behavior relative to existing principles rather than asking the question as to whether the principle is worthwhile.

Kohlberg does not hold the view that the moral development of the child is a function of learned moral behavior from adults. Through the preconventional, conventional and post conventional levels, the individual examines moral principles apart from those specified by the groups. Kohlberg specifies various stages of moral development within each of these levels.<sup>69</sup>

At the preconventional level, according to Kohlberg, it seems that the orientation is towards an emotive context. A person reacts based upon feelings and opinions, directing actions based upon a reward and punishment system. The second level views the individual as tending towards conformist behavior. At the third level, a person compares action to right behavior as defined by the standards of society. There is an awareness of personal values regarding right or wrong with a final orientation towards self-chosen





ethical principles. But these are universal principles such as truth, justice and freedom so that the person continues to function within the framework of social standards.

This approach to moral development is verified to some extent by empirical research, however, it does not explain how moral judgments are made. It describes a process of moral education where the culture defines certain expectations from persons at certain age levels. At the higher stages, persons will examine the meaningfulness of a value but normally in terms of whether one is going to conform to the value, and not in terms of whether the value ought to be modified or discarded. This implication is inherent in Kohlberg's theory inasmuch as the child moves into the education system of the culture. If the child is excluded from the normal education system as we view it, then different value structures are learned. Regardless of the environment, the child learns certain values. These values may not conform to those generally accepted as standard in the society. Nevertheless, the values do exist in the particular environment and as such are learned.

Why is this an important point to consider? It illustrates the nature of a complex society with many varied value systems. A person, at stage five of Kohlberg's theory, is simply evaluating which of many different kinds of standards he is prepared to accept without challenging the basic framework of standards. The ghetto standards are as real to the culture as those taught by the finishing school.



Kohlberg's theory of moral development suggests that development occurs in a step-wise fashion and that one moves through successively higher steps until a stage of "universal ethical principle orientation" is reached. I would suggest that Kohlberg's theory does give insight into the processes of moral development and that it does free our thinking from absolute reliance on the impact of cultural expectations on human motivation. It argues that the individual moves through various stages of development adhering to group values to a higher order development of principles which serves as the basis of one's personal philosophy of life.

The cognitive-development approach to moral education centered its views on the notion that moral development of the child is achieved in stimulating the active thinking of the child. It was Dewey who stated that the aim of the school is to foster intellectual and moral development. He argued that ethical principles can aid the school in building a strong and powerful character. The cognitive-developmental approach suggests that moral development occurs through stages and therefore the school must provide the conditions under which the psychological and moral development must occur.<sup>70</sup>

There is no doubt that moral development occurs in stages. Moral development is closely aligned with the development of the mind, for without a mature understanding of the world, a person is unlikely to objectively question the moral principles. Knowledge and understanding are



achieved through training of the mind, both intellectually and morally, so that a meaningful personal moral philosophy ought to be developed. Educational institutions are charged with the responsibility of carrying out the aims of education, which theoretically are to engender a sense of equality, freedom and respect for persons. They hope to achieve this end by appealing to the interests of the students. Interest is heightened by students participating in what might be called worthwhile activities.

But the institutions also maintain degrees of social control by using rewards and punishments. The authority structure is extremely formal with the teacher remaining the central source of all authority. Consequently, the aims of education, which advocate the moral development of a child, are implemented in an environment which is far less democratic than is necessary to stimulate the active thinking required in the cognitive development approach.

While I do not intend to further pursue the question of the democratization of schools, Kozol and Holt have discussed this question quite fully. What is of concern however, is the premise that moral development occurs through active thinking. Educational institutions, because of the need for social control, promote conformity and homogeneity. The student is not expected to question moral principles, but rather is asked to adopt the moral and cultural norms. There is no clear evidence that educators are prepared to function in more democratic environments





which will promote unrestricted analyses of moral principles. But I dare say, there probably are some educators who have the courage to introduce challenging subjects regarding laws, sex and conduct, in order that students might determine for themselves if they are worthwhile.

But the question of which moral principles one ought to adopt or discard is not necessarily rational. On the contrary, moral behavior is more a function of the person and not simply his capacity to think logically or to learn the norms of the culture. A new kind of thinking, integrative as it were, is required in the area of moral education.<sup>71</sup> One technique suggests affect and system problem-solving where the class is given an exercise which centers on moral issues such as: discrimination, abortion, or lawlessness. The variety of experiences, both cognitive and affective, will provide the incentives for the students to argue a certain course of action.

Confluent education is emerging as a branch of the progressive school of thought. It recognizes the affective or opinion aspect on issues, as well as the cognitive. This new approach combines the theories of Dewey with the humanities and techniques of mental health education.

The basic premises of confluent education emphasize the idea that the individual knows and controls his or her own values in the world. Secondly, emotions and opinions do exist, and remain a major force in the shaping, modifying or



discarding of values. Thirdly, it is not possible to separate the physical and intellectual being from the affective. Fourth, the individual's experiences are grounded in the past and all future decisions will be influenced by the past. Autonomy may be found by seeking the good life for others as well as for oneself. These premises are basic and suggest that the schools must develop an environment which, according to Simpson, optimizes human creative potential.<sup>72</sup>

Simpson views confluent education as being facilitated by ensuring the gratification of basic needs. Small group experiences ensure the final development of individual identity and the self. It seems logical however, that there will exist the group conformity pressures any time a group discusses an issue. Language as a symbol system is effective in expanding the conceptual abilities of the learner. Use of body for the physicalization of abstract concepts develops feeling and thinking competence. The study of the arts engenders expression of the subconscious, in particular where it assists in the development of the imagination.<sup>73</sup>

I have highlighted these techniques because they reflect some of the work in progress in the confluent educational area. It recognizes that there are certain techniques which may be used to develop creativity and that creativity and examination of moral values may be synonymous. Creativity includes both intellectual and affective freedom to



examine and to feel freely about certain issues and to adopt them as personal values. I have not attempted to examine whether or not creativity can be learned. Certainly, the learning processes constitute a large part of life's experiences, and it is within the context of these experiences that a person's inclination to accept or examine moral principles is formed. Further examination of the relationship between creativity and moral issues is necessary. It is a simplistic premise when we admit that creative persons will critically examine alternatives to issues, and perhaps give direction to the remaining culture. One must be cautious in presupposing that creative persons are any more able to discern differences between good or bad. Indeed, the moral principles of the culture are so greatly inculcated that definitions of good, even if implicitly in the mind, do exist. And it may be that the creative person thinks about what is important and what is not, at least to him personally, but within established moral principles.

This indicates that not only are persons thinking about a more integrated theory to the questioning and establishing of moral values, they are experimenting in the classroom, using techniques which will hopefully create within a student a desire to examine and evaluate moral issues. Why is moral education important? There is presently only a general relationship between moral philosophy and moral education. The opposition to the Vietnam war, the demand for ethical principles by those in high offices, and the





general social unrest of the 1960s were indicative of the changing scene.

The state has embraced certain principles to ensure social control and enhance its material issues. The breakdown in respect for traditional concepts and offices forces the problem of defining moral principles for the good of the society. Further, the economic aims of the state are meaningful only if all people feel that the principles required to achieve these aims are worthwhile. The liberal society has difficulty in establishing the rules under which its citizens will live as the kind of leadership style requires a responsiveness to the multiple needs of the society.<sup>74</sup>

Some of the attitudes, such as the opinion that the aim of education is to indoctrinate, are under critical examination. Wilson et al. state that when confronted with a loss of our values, we attempt to structure a new set.<sup>75</sup> Unfortunately, our experience has an authoritarian basis. Under what circumstances does one accept that the traditional values no longer apply? Further, upon what basis does one build a new set of values? How does one justify the moral values and establish new ones? A basis for moral education should consist of a recognition that skills are required to examine moral principles, and that there must be some means of learning these skills.

Wilson states that the child must be taught certain basic skills which will allow him to function meaningfully



in the society. The child must have a code to follow but the code which parents pass on may not permit the child to function well as an adult. The norms passed on are, however, the best set as determined by the principles of rationality.<sup>76</sup> Wilson et al. ask whether or not moral education is a subject, and they come to the conclusion that it is based on the premise that morally educated persons have certain characteristics such as an awareness for the feelings of others. A certain program or subject may assist one in developing these characteristics. Therefore, moral education is only indirectly part of educational processes. Rather various disciplines one studies may sharpen the skills in evaluating moral principles.<sup>77</sup>

This interesting notion suggests that only a person who is as broadly educated as possible will develop such skills. It can give no prescribed pattern of educational programs which will lead to morally developed persons. It assumes the principles of rationality are the vehicles by which values are examined. The premise implies that the child must be taught certain moral skills, but assumes that broadly based education will result in the spirit of a creative mind.

The common thread which exists throughout the discussion is that there is little connection between moral education and moral philosophy. In this paper it is suggested that there are theories within which moral judgments are made. Moral education, with few exceptions such as confluent education, centers on principles of



rationality.

A further commonality is that there is a tendency towards the 'morally educated person'. This implies that codes of conduct are not emphasized but rather a person learns the skills of analysis and enquiry by which values might be questioned. While this notion does seem appealing, the techniques available are inadequate to permit the normal educator to teach the skills. The methodology is not sufficient to say that if followed by the educator, it will guarantee morally educated persons.

The basis of Kohlberg's philosophy is twofold; the cultural relativity of ethics is in error, and that morality is not based on emotional processes of habit, rewards, punishment, identification and defense. According to Kohlberg, the non-relativist, "cognitive development" theory is a rational approach towards the explanation of the moral education processes. Kohlberg proposes that moral development - the rearing of ethical principles is the end of a natural development in social functioning and thinking.<sup>78</sup>

Cultural relativity - the facet of cultural diversification - leads to confusion on exactly what should be ideal morality - "realistic ideas of tolerance (ethical relativism) which lead to confusion about the facts (cultural relativism)."<sup>79</sup>

The confusion exists between the relativity of moral principles and the relativity of blaming or punishing persons or groups who do not act in accordance with these principles.





The question is, then, one of the relativity of moral beliefs - how shall they be defined as applicable to the individual in certain situations - and the argument that such beliefs must be inculcated into the individual to serve as a framework for behavior. In the absence of these beliefs as outwardly displayed, the person must be outwardly punished. Kohlberg argues that there is a higher order scheme of principles which determines the moral behavior of others. Moral principles rise above the dictates of culturally developed norms and the reasoning individual evaluates and acts in accordance with personally defined principles based on justice.

Kohlberg considers the question of rationality in terms of the scientific cultural influence - the value neutrality - based on cognition, and concludes that rationality can exist only where there is a method or process of evaluation in explaining and attaining moral beliefs and it is to this end that Kohlberg dedicated himself to the empirical study of a process of moral development.<sup>80</sup>

I cannot argue against the cognitive development aspect of Kohlberg's view, but it is my belief that Kohlberg had a distaste for an indoctrinating type of moral philosophy and a "bag of virtues approach" that he decided to go on at the other end of the spectrum.

The person must also have mature social skills, for to counter accepted value systems requires the person to rationalize his new position. While the quality of a value



may be perceived through feelings or some awareness, it must be explainable, and therefore rationalized to others. No absolute methodology presently exists for the educator to follow. Nor is there likely to be one as in the development of a morally educated person, the educator is decidedly on his own. The overwhelming tendency is to remain cautious, teaching the young useful conventional techniques within predetermined cultural standards.



## Chapter VII: Conclusion Two

The answer to the questions of how ethical judgments are made, and whether the educational system acts as an influence in this process are inconclusive. However, I will briefly highlight the conclusions which are frequently stated throughout this treatise.

There is no one, single absolute theory which effectively explains how ethical judgments are made. Naturalism, as a theory, is defended by Foot who views man as making ethical judgments depending upon the manner in which he perceives the evidence. Beliefs are formed from the evidence which one views, and how one perceives the evidence will depend upon the nature of the beliefs.

How one forms beliefs within the framework of established codes of conduct is another question. It may be that experiences and attitudes will affect how one views the world and thereon makes ethical judgments. Man naturally evaluates whether it be from first principles or within the framework of existing moral codes. The consequences of all actions are viewed as to whether they are worthwhile, and based upon this evaluation, a person will determine if the action is to be repeated. Acceptability of certain courses of action will be determined by what is considered to be good or bad. How one determines





what is good, is a difficult question. But the question exists within the context of existing cultural norms. If the consequences of an action are considered to be ethically good, it must be set either within the context of the culturally defined good, or it is defined to be so from first principles. If the consequences of the action are not affirmed by the culture, the individual must have some basis for evaluation from first principles.

The second major conclusion is: that the Naturalism Theory cannot stand as an absolute theory of the way in which ethical judgments are derived. Naturalism provides some insight into the process of evaluation when examining facts, but fails to explain how ethical judgments are formed when confronted by a course of action contrary to the culturally accepted direction.

Intuitivism claims that man is aware of what is good or bad. It does so on the basis that certain words, such as good, are evaluative but have no natural properties. While I have argued that the indefinability of good is insufficient evidence upon which to refute the Naturalism Theory, nevertheless, it does provide some insight as to how ethical judgments may be made from first principles.

The third major conclusion is: that while the Intuitionist Theory provides insight into how a person may derive ethical judgments from first principles, irrespective of the cultural norms, it does not successfully refute the Naturalism Theory, nor does it provide an



absolute theory for deriving ethical judgments.

Emotivism recognized that persons have feelings and opinions about certain subjects. The feelings are aroused by certain words or actions which are observed, with the consequence that certain responses will ensue. Ethical judgments can be made only when feelings are translated into some action. It is not sufficient to argue that feelings about something represent an ethical judgment, unless there is some evidence to confirm that an ethical judgment was made. Evaluations cannot be made on feeling alone. Certainly words will arouse feelings and direct actions, but ethical judgments are based on other criteria as well.

The fourth major conclusion is: that while the Emotive Theory recognizes that ethical judgments involves feelings and opinions, it neglects firm evidence upon which ethical judgments have been made. Ethical judgments must be based upon more than simple emotions. Therefore, the Emotive Theory fails to provide an absolute theory for making ethical judgments.

The fifth major conclusion argues for recognition of an integrated theory. It recognized the complexities of the determination of ethical judgments and argues for the integration of the three theories. This theory would view Intuitionism and Emotivism as major contributors by recognizing that elements of awareness and strong feelings lead one to develop ethical judgments. Further, the



feelings or awareness are engendered by life's experiences, and the consequences of any actions initiated from feelings about something are reflected in natural occurrences.

Judgments may originate from observing natural occurrences, rationally evaluating the circumstances and, through the interplay of intuition and feelings, reaching a conclusion.

What kind of education is necessary, not simply for the moral development of the child, but for building the skills necessary to analyze existing values and to determine changes? Cognitive-development is insufficient, there must be a development of the individual to a state where ethical judgments are actively pursued.

The sixth major conclusion is: the young must develop analytical and humanistic skills so that whether naturalistically, intuitively, or emotionally existing ethical principles can be challenged. The forms of intuitivism and emotivism conceived in support of this conclusion, would be consistent with the use of reasoning as well as feeling and intuition in making moral judgments.

A crucial aspect of the philosophy outlined here is that it assumes the educational system should perform a total role of educating, socializing, and satisfying a wide spectrum of the needs of the young. It further assumes that educators are highly integrated, vital, socially responsible and concerned individuals who have been adequately educated to perform this multitude of duties well.

I strongly suspect and recommend that, while the





philosophy expressed in the last conclusion gives the teacher a broad mandate to act and with a definite aim, the teacher will govern the class in a style unique to himself - a style which is natural to his personality. Education is an art, not a routine.

Students exhibit value structures not favored by the state and their basic skills and abilities to critically evaluate are not being developed. The reactionaries are quick to point out that the progressive, confluent education system is not working. I would submit that it never worked since it was never adequately implemented. The rigidity of the public system and the inadequate competencies and confidence of the teachers, never allowed them to substantially depart from the rigid, authoritarian environment. Therefore, the conclusion should also read; the educators must develop analytical and humanistic skills so that whether naturalistically, intuitively, or emotionally, existing ethical principles can be challenged.



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